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Abstract We are concerned with the problem of summarizing the contents of a
coherent text. In this paper we argue that complex units of symbols like sentences,
for example, are signs and the meaning of a text arises via their interaction. We
introduce a model for the generation of summaries and illustrate its potential by a
realistic example.
Keywords: C.S. Peirce, logic, summarization, semiotics, meaning
1 Introduction
When we read a text, in the end, we may have a single thought which is our com-
prehension of its meaning. Even if the text is long and complex we may be able to
summarize its contents by a single sentence. Such a process of summarization could
be alternatively called meaning extraction.
Traditionally, text summarization is typically based on a statistical or syntacti-
cal analysis ([Jon93], [EN98]). We argue that, in virtue of their formal character,
such approaches may not be able to find the ‘natural’ meaning represented by a
text. In this paper we introduce an approach which stresses the sign character of
language. We will assume that language consists of symbols which are signs, that
such signs arise from input stimuli via a cognitive process (making use of existing
lexical knowledge) and, finally, that their meaning emerges via mediation.
Recently we introduced such a sign-based model for the syntactic analysis of
sentences, which will be extensively referred to in this paper ([FS00], [SF01]). Here,
we will argue that a similar model applies if complex units of symbols like sentences
themselves are considered as signs. Such a model can explain how complex units
may contribute to a text, as signs of thought. We illustrate the proposed approach
by a realistic example of a text fragment found in a thesis ([Hui96]).
1.1 Informal Analysis
Our sample text (cf. fig. 1) concerns the definition of the concept of information re-
trieval system. Before introducing any theory, let us informally analyse the sentences
of the given fragment.
The analysis as presented in sect. 4 assumes a syntactic analysis of some sort,
and therefore we need to provide at least a reasonably detailed analysis at that
label text abbreviation
1 There are several document-bases. sev, docb
2 Each document-base contains docb
different types of information. dt-of-info
3.1 There are various types of users and vt-of-users
3.2 there are vast differences between
their information needs. vdiff, t-ineeds
4.1 There are various kinds of search-tasks, vk-of-st
4.2 or stated differently,
4.3 there are several ways in which a user sev-ws
can be satisfied with the returned information. canb-satf, ret-info
Fig. 1: Sample text
level. Note, however, that there are certainly other possible analyses than the one
presented here, quite probably rendering different semantics. The primary goal of
our informal analysis is merely to describe the clusters of language symbols we take to
be the input of our further analysis. We assume such an analysis to be strictly based
on syntactic properties of the input symbols. The syntactic terminology largely
follows a standard work on descriptive English grammar ([QGLS85]). S=subject,
V=verb, C=Complement, O=object, A= adverbial.
Though we aim to develop a formal approach to meaning extraction, in the
course of the informal pre-analysis presented in this section we tentatively make use
of some concepts related to “text grammar” or “naive” (informal) semantics. The
hidden agenda of the section is to work towards a potential interpretation of the
parts of the text and then relate them to the meaning of the text as a whole.
In (1) above we have so-called existential there (S) as the ‘grammatical subject’,
followed by main verb be (V), document-bases as the ‘notional subject’ (O) with
the quantifier several. There is a syntactic place-holder in the regular subjective
position, whereas the ‘notional subject’ is the compound noun taking the object
position. There and several document bases both are of a subjective nature, be it at
different levels of analysis.
In (2) we observe: Each document base (S); Each, which relates to the quantifier
several in (1); contains (V); an objectival noun phrase headed by information and
modified by genitive different types (of). It is asserted that information is held in
each document base, and that this information comes in different types for each
document-base. If we assume that no other properties of the document-base are
relevant in context, it can be argued that information held by it is in fact what
defines document-bases. Therefore, in context contains is equivalent to be.
The analysis of (3.1) is similar to that of (1); coordinating and simply joins
the two clauses (3.1) and (3.2). In (3.2) we again have existential there (S), vast
differences heads the object, and the adverbial prepositional phrase makes explicit
that those differences hold between the information needs of the users; the possessive
pronoun their refers to users in (3.1).
(4.1) is analyzed similar to (1). (4.2) is an explicit statement at text grammatical
level, indicating that (4.1) is paraphrased in (4.3). Interestingly, we are presented
with two different expressions of what must essentially be the same meaning. It
is to be expected that the two phrasings contribute to the general meaning of the
complete text by presenting the same essential meaning by means of two quite
different expressions.
In (4.3), not unlike in (2), the several ways are not only complemented by in
which..., but because no other information is relevant in context concerning those
ways, the complement defines ways. In context, the complement is arguably more
meaningful than several ways, and in any case is linked to it tightly. From a semantic
point of view, the prepositional construction in which ... can be seen as similar to
an explicit predication using be.
Interestingly, a definite article is used in the returned information, supposedly
referring to returned information already understood to be there by the reader,
whereas no such returned information has been explicitly mentioned in the text.
Closest comes the types of information in (2); returned is never explicitly mentioned,
only hinted at in (4.1) (assuming that tasks have something to do with the returning
of information). In fact, it could be argued that, given that (4.1) already introduces
search tasks, the explicit introduction of returned information in the text is the most
important semantic contribution of (4.3).
Having identified clusters of symbols, we now turn to the question why these
clusters, given the particular order in which they occur, do indeed define something
meaningful that amounts to a definition of information retrieval system.
2 A Semiotic Model of Language
In our analysis of signs we follow the principles of Peirce’s semiotics ([Pei31], [Tej88]).
Accordingly, a sign signifies its object to an agent in some sense, which is called the
interpretant of the sign. The irreducible relation of sign, object and interpretant
(each of which is a sign, recursively) is called the triadic relation of sign. We assume
that the ground for any sign is a contrast in the ‘real’ world. How is such a contrast
cognitively observed?
2.1 Cognitive Basis
Following cognition theory ([Har87]), the recognition of any sign must begin with
the sensation of the physical input. Physical stimuli enter the human receiver via
the senses which continuously transform the raw data into internal sensation. The
output of the senses, a bio-electric signal, is processed by the brain in percepts. The
generation of such a percept is triggered by a change in the input, typically, or by
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Fig. 2: Cognitive model of sign recognition
the duration of some sampling time, e.g. in the case of visual perception.
The brain compares the current percept with the previous one, and this enables
it to distinguish between two sorts of input qualities: one, which was there and
remained there, something stable, which we will call a continuant ; and another,
which was not there, but is there now (or vice versa), something changing, which
we will call an occurrent. The collections of continuants and occurrents, which are
inherently related to each other, form the basis for our perception of a phenomenon
as a sign. We also assume that, by means of selective attention, we recognize in these
collections coherent sets of qualities: the qualities of the observed and those of the
complementary part of the phenomenon. We will refer to these sets collectively as
the input. We will assume that these sets are the primary signs we observe: qualities
which are signs. Such signs, which are called in Peirce’s terminology a qualisign, are
special signs for which we have no denotation. Although qualisigns are coherent, by
definition, we experience them as independent signs.
In [FS00] we have shown that the above model allows for qualisigns to be inter-
preted as Boolean logical functions. If the above collections are represented as sets
(in the mathematical sense), we can define our ‘universe’ as the union of the sets
of qualities of the qualisigns. Notice that these sets are coherently related to each
other, contrary to formal logic in which the universe is an arbitrary set. If the sets
are finite, the universe is a ‘closed’ world by definition. A schematic diagram of our
cognitive model of signs and their logical representation is depicted in fig. 2.
2.2 Classification of Sign
In his semiotic theory, Peirce defined an ingenious classification of signs. In his
view, the most complete signs are the icon, index, and symbol which represent their
object on the basis of, respectively, similarity, causality and arbitrary consensus.
Besides this taxonomy, Peirce also distinguishes signs, respectively, according to
the categorical status of the sign, and according to the relationship between object
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Fig. 3: Peirce’s classification of signs
and interpretant. From a categorical perspective, signs can be qualisigns, sinsigns
or legisigns, which correspond, respectively, to firstness, secondness and thirdness.
In other words, a sign can be a quality, an actual event, or a rule. Seen from the
perspective of the relationship between object and interpretant, a sign may be a
rheme, a dicent or an argument. In other words a sign may signify a qualitative
possibility, an actual existence, or a proposition. Thus we obtain nine kinds of
sign which may be arranged in a matrix as shown in fig. 3 (the meaning of the
horizontal lines and directed edges will be explained later). Although Peirce also
defined more complex systems of signs, we hold that his ‘simple’ classification is
the most practical ([DFS99],[FS99]). We argue that his signs can be identified in
different symbol phenomena like Boolean logic, syntax, and syllogistic logic. The
first two of these have been discussed in [FS00] and [SF01], the last one is the subject
of the current paper.
2.3 A Model of Signs
How do complex signs emerge? We argue that semiosis (the generation of the
interpretant) can be defined as a process in which trichotomic relations emerge
recursively, revealing gradually more accurate and clear approximations of the full
richness of a sign of the observed phenomenon. Accordingly, the proposition of the
input as a sign arises from the input qualisigns via a number of other signs. In this
process, icon, index and symbol signs function as sign (in the sense of the triadic
relation) whereas other signs function as (the signs of) their object. It turns out
([FS00]) that semiosis can be defined as the interaction of adjacent signs (cf. the
horizontal lines in fig. 3). For example, an argument sign can emerge from the
interaction of a dicent and symbol sign.
In virtue of the fast and continuous nature of cognition, we will assume that
the signs of a phenomenon are not recognized isolatedly, but only as ‘temporary’
signs which are approximations of the final proposition. We argue that such signs
are re-presentations of the qualisigns, and their types are identical to the classes
defined by Peirce. The recognition process we have in mind can be illustrated by
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Fig. 4: Aspects of signs and stages of recognition
the perception of a motion picture. In that process, a series of pictures are input
which are not recognized isolatedly, but which are necessary for observing motion
as a change between the first and last picture of such a series.
According to our model ([FS00]), sign recognition proceeds in stages. Each stage
is associated with a different kind of re-presentation of the qualisigns (cf. fig. 4). In
the first stage the observed qualisigns are grouped by sorting them according to the
aspects of part (icon) and whole (sinsign). Notice that any ‘part’ of the input is
similar to it, and that the input as a ‘whole’ is a simultaneous occurrence of the parts,
an actual event (which happens now). The qualisigns of a phenomenon are different
signs, but which have a common origin. Therefore, in the second stage, icon and
sinsign are compared with each other yielding the ‘abstract’ re-presentations of the
qualisigns: the observed qualisigns independent from each other (rheme), how they
are related to the complementary signs (index), and the law-like relation of their
simultaneous occurrence (legisign). The index, which is alternatively called the
context, is a pointer, linking and converting between part and whole. In the third
stage, the abstract signs are completed by the information of the complementary
ones. This yields the signs of the actual relations of the parts of the observed
phenomenon (dicent), and the property characterizing them as a whole (symbol).
Dicent and symbol are also called subject and predicate. Finally, the completed
signs are merged to a single proposition (argument) about the final meaning of the
relation between the observed qualisigns.
The above model has been applied for the derivation of a classification and ontol-
ogy of Boolean logical signs. Currently we have shown that a sequential version of
this model amounts to a model of language signs (morphological and syntactical). In
such a model, input signs which are symbols appear one after the other as qualisigns,
and complex signs arise via interaction in a bottom-up fashion (cf. the directed edges
in fig. 3). Because the universes of such qualisigns may be independent of each other,
syntactic symbols can only interact (or bind) if they are compatible. Whether two
symbols are, or are not compatible follows from their relational properties. Such
properties, which are sets of qualities, are defined class-wise. The sign of a binding
is a representation of the union of the qualities of the constituent symbols, i.e of
their qualisigns, recursively.
Due to their sequential nature, language symbol interactions have also degenerate
forms. One of them is accumulation, in which an existing sign is combined with
another sign of the same type. Such an interaction assigns the same meaning to both
constituents thereby rendering them indistinguishable. The other one is coercion,
in which a new sign is generated for the denotation of an existing sign. Coercion
applies if the signs, which are to interact, are incapable of accumulation or binding
([SF01]).
3 Syllogistic Logic
We will argue that syllogistic signs can be modeled analogously to Boolean logical
and language signs. Accordingly, in this section we will refer by a sign class to the
classification of syllogistic signs. Although syllogism is the simplest form of predicate
logic, its importance in human cognition is generally acknowledged.
The doctrine of syllogisms goes back to Aristotle ([Boc61]) who identified three
syllogistic schemes. The differences between the schemes lie in the representation
of the common terms (cf. fig. 5). In scheme 1 they are subject and predicate,
respectively, in the first and second premise. In scheme 2 they are subject, and
in scheme 3 predicate, in both premises. Syllogistic logic is related to semantics
and reasoning. In what follows, we will briefly introduce semantic signs. Because
of space, in this paper we will restrict ourselves to the description of those aspects
of semantics which are needed for our sample example in sect. 4. The signs of
reasoning –abduction, induction and deduction– are not specified in this paper.
3.1 Semantics
We argue that semantic signs arise via a re-analysis of the syntactic sign interactions.
We assume that the semantic qualities of a sign can be specified in terms of the
most complete triad of signs: icon, index and symbol. For example, verbs can
denote existence (e.g. be), state (e.g. sleep), and transition (e.g. give); nouns can
be expressive of a thing (e.g. apple), reference (e.g. the name John), and something
symbolic (e.g. agent John). Such a triad can be interpreted as a ‘meaning’ ordering:
icon<index<symbol. For example, an iconic sign of a triad is less meaningful than
an indexical one of the same triad.
Although the qualities of a symbol are lexically defined with respect to its func-
tion as a sign in the sense of the trichotomic relation, a symbol can also function as
object. We require that in every symbol interaction, those qualities are considered
which correspond to the category aspect of the sign. For example, in a rheme and
index interaction the qualities referring to the category of secondness are taken from
both the rheme and the index sign. Accordingly, though syntactic and semantic signs
are isomorphic by definition, their sign recognition processes are different.
The linking and conversion potential of the index can be identified in our model
of semantic signs, as follows. We allow for two index signs to unify, either if they are
equivalent (semantically), or, if they are converses of each other. The latter relation
holds if the two signs refer to semantic qualisigns which are lexical counterparts.
By definition, two qualisigns are counterparts if they represent, respectively, the
continuant and occurrent collections of the observed part of the same phenomenon.
For example, ‘search’ and ‘way’ can be related in such a way. Indeed, if we observe
‘search’ to occur, there may be present some ‘way’, in which the search is carried out,
for example. Another example of a pair of counterparts is ‘need’ (continuant) and
‘task’ (occurrent). We require that the information about counterparts is lexically
given.
In our approach to meaning extraction we will assume that in a symbol inter-
action a semantically less meaningful sign can be ignored (or removed) potentially.
However, such a removal must also respect the sign’s referential properties. By keep-
ing track of the sets of qualities of the different qualisigns we can find out which
qualities are not referred to in a later interaction. Clearly, such qualities can be re-
moved without affecting the meaning of later signs. For example, the sign ‘various’
can be removed from ‘various types’ if the number of ‘types’ is not referred to in
the rest of the text. Although we may only remove a qualisign when it turns out
that it has no relevance for a later sign, it will be assumed that such ‘knowledge’
is always available. Finally, we mention that anaphoric references will be assumed
to be solved via the unification of qualities. Also quantification is considered a se-
mantic sign, in the generation of which the role of index symbols is central. In so
far as the index is, amongst others, the sign of the complementary qualities of the
observed part ([FS00]), it can complete a rheme or a legisign with the qualities of
their referential meaning. Although such a meaning can be represented in different
ways via conversion (e.g. existentially or universally), this aspect is not discussed
in the paper. We will assume that the sentences of the example of fig. 1 can all be
represented as universally quantified premises.
In the rest of the paper we will concentrate on syllogisms. We will assume that
the input sentences (which are syntactic signs) are first recognised as semantic signs.
Such signs will be considered as qualisigns in a subsequent syllogistic sign generation.
We will assume that all earlier representations of such signs are available (e.g. their
syntactic interactions, semantic qualities etc.). Because a sentence arises by merging
subject (S) and predicate (P), a proposition can be interpreted in two different ways,
either as a characterisation of S by P, or the other way round. For example, the
sentence ‘this stove is black’ can be comprehended as a characterisation of ‘this
stove’ by ‘being black’, or of ‘to-be-black’ by ‘this stove’.
3.2 Syllogism
We argue that a classification of syllogistic logical signs is isomorphic to the se-
quential model of signs. Accordingly, input premises enter one after the other as
qualisign, and signs arise bottom-up via syllogism (cf. binding); accumulation cor-
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Fig. 5: Classification of syllogistic signs and syllogisms
responds to unification. Because a syllogism requires a common term which may be
represented differently in the two premises, a syllogism may need unification as well.
Also unification can be represented as a premise; due to its bi-directional nature,
such a premise has two different forms which can be used alternatively.
A Peircean specification of syllogistic signs follows directly from the differences
between the three schemes (cf. fig. 5; the label of a horizontal line refers to the
corresponding scheme). Because a sentence is an assertion about the subject or the
predicate, and in the sequential model each sign has a single type, a premise can be
represented as either a continuant or an occurrent syllogistic qualisign. From this
it follows, that such a premise can be coerced to an icon (‘subject’ premise), or a
sinsign (‘predicate’ premise). Such a sign, then, can become a rheme or a legisign,
or an index, respectively, a major or minor premise of a syllogism. In accordance
with the meaning of the schemes 2 and 3, such a rheme and legisign, respectively,
refer to a possible subject and predicate of the entire text as a phenomenon. This
follows from their function in the realisation of the major term (respectively, X and
C) of the conclusion, in both schemes. The meaning of an indexical premise (if
there is any) is conform to the complementary meaning of the index. Such a sign
can contribute to a more complete sign of the subject or the predicate of the entire
text.
Because in our model all sets are finite, premises and conclusions can always
be universally quantified. Clearly such a quantification requires that the universe
of the signs involved is restricted to the qualities defined by all unifications due
to earlier syllogisms. The consequences of this are twofold. First, it simplifies the
generation of syllogistic signs; second, it implies the need for the representation
of sets of qualities referring to the “context” (in the traditional sense) in which a
premise holds.
We mentioned that in our model the input premises are not recognised isolatedly,
but only as approximations of the (single) argument sign of the phenomenon repre-
senting the entire text. Because, contrary to syntactic symbols, premises possess a
meaning which is finished, such signs can be represented (degenerately) as a sign of
any class. Which class it eventually will be, may depend on a hypothesis. Another
consequence of the above property of premises is that the order of the input signs
is less strict then, for example, in the case of syntax (note that the temporal aspect
of signs is beyond the scope of this paper).
Although approximations are unfinished signs, such signs are premises, therefore
we allow for an approximation to be represented as a finished sign in order to be
stored in the (long term) memory. When required, such signs can be recalled and
represented as an approximation sign. We assume that the memory is random
accessible.
4 Sample Analysis
In this section we analyse the premises of our sample text, and generate their sum-
mary stepwise. We will denote a premise as <Q,A,B> where Q stands for the
qualifier and A and B denote the minor and major terms, respectively (notice that
B is always preceded by is). We will refer to the sentences by the labels and abbrevi-
ations introduced in fig. 1. In some cases, symbols which are removed, syntactically
or semantically, are not omitted for reasons of legibility. In a syllogism, however,
such sign will be considered as not being present.
With respect to their semantic value, we will assume that there are iconic (or
degenerate indexical) signs: docb, needs, info, types, diff, vast, various, several, be,
between; and indexical signs: of-users, dt-of, their, vk-of. We allow for a symbol, ‘x
of y’, to be alternatively represented as (x of) y, or x (of y), or (x) (of) (y) where
symbols enclosed in parentheses refer to a single sign. If any of x or y is removed,
of can be omitted as well.
1 <ALL,docb,is>
The ‘grammatical’ subject there can be removed syntactically (also in other
cases); several can be omitted (‘quantificationally’), its meaning is incorporated
in the quantification sign. We assume that (1) is represented as an icon, which
hypothesis is supported by the iconic meaning of docb and is (semantically).
2 <ALL,dt-of-info,is docb>
We argue that contain can, in context, be semantically interpreted as a form of
be, hence the sentence can be paraphrased as shown; each is incorporated in the
quantifier. Because we represented (1) as an icon, we may assume that (2) will
become a sinsign. Indeed, the current premise is about some ‘change’ (an appearing
new fact), which makes its interpretation as an ‘actual event’ possible. Because the
remaining premises are not directly related to those analyzed so far, we will assume
that (1) and (2) are coerced to a dicent and a symbol sign which, then, are merged
syllogistically.
1 <ALL,docb,is>
2 <ALL,dt-of-info,is docb>
⇒ <ALL,dt-of-info,is>
The unification of the two occurrences of the common term amounts to a tautol-
ogy which is removed. By now we know that ‘there are dt-of-info’, which could be
a summary of the text analyzed so far. Because there are more sentences to come,
we will assume that the current summary as a sign is saved in the memory for later
use.
3.1 <ALL,vt-of-users,is>
The degenerate indexical sign various can be removed from the subject term,
semantically, for reasons mentioned earlier.
3.2 <ALL,vdiff,is t-ineeds>
Semantically, the iconic vast and the degenerate indexical between can be omit-
ted; their and users are unified. Again, we will initially assume that the current
premises are icon and sinsign which become a dicent and a symbol sign via coer-
cions.
<ALL,vt-of-users,is>
<ALL,vdiff,is t-ineeds>
⇒ <SOME,t-ineeds,is>
By restricting its universe, the conclusion can be represented as a universally
quantified premise. It will be assumed that this sign becomes an index, via degen-
eration. The two forms of the common term are vt-of-users and vdiff. Because,
semantically, types is iconic, but of users is indexical, the existence of a common
term requires that types and diff unify. We assume that these symbols are lexical
counterparts.
At this point we can fetch the earlier sign, <ALL,dt-of-info,is>, and accumu-
late it with the current one, <ALL,t-ineeds,is>. There are indexical signs in both
premises, respectively, dt-of and their, but which have different references. The
sign ineeds is a syntactic accumulation of the iconic nouns, info and needs. Clearly,
dt-of-info and t-ineeds have a common iconic part (info), their unification can be
expressed as <ALL,t-ineeds,is dt-of-info> which is universally quantified via re-
stricting the universe of its terms. The resulting premise is stored in memory. Our
analysis so far illustrates that there is a relation between users and docb via t-ineeds.
4.1 <ALL,vk-of-st,is>
4.3 <ALL,user-canb-satf-with-ret-info,is sev-ws>
In (4.1) the degenerate indexical sign various can be removed, semantically.
Notice that (4.2) is a coordination sign, syntactically, which is an explicit statement
about the different types of (4.1) and (4.3). We may use this information in raising
the ‘right’ hypotheses for these sentences as syllogistic signs. In (4.3), in which can
be removed syntactically.
By assuming that (4.1) is finally recognized as a dicent, and (4.3) as a symbol sign
(which is motivated by the presence of the modal auxiliary can), the final argument
sign emerges from their interaction as follows.
<ALL,vk-of-st,is>
<ALL,user-canb-satf-with-ret-info,is sev-ws>
⇒ <ALL,user-canb-satf-with-ret-info,is>
The common terms are vk-of-st and sev-ws. Here, vk-of is indexical; sev can
be removed semantically. The existence of a common term requires that st and ws
unify. Such unification is possible, because st is a syntactic accumulation of search
and task, and search and ways are lexical counterparts.
If, as we argue, there are vk-of-st and sev-ws which are equivalent, why then are
vk-of-st and user-canb-satf-with-ret-info related?
We may observe that the latter term is a sentence which arises from the dicent
user and the symbol canb-satf-with-ret-info. Here, also the predicate is a complex
sign, in which with-ret-info is a context sign, syntactically. Because with-ret-info,
which is sign in the sense of the trichotomic relation, points in the direction of its
object, the legisign canb-satf, and selects its actual meaning, it is sufficient to show
that there is a relation in which vk-of-st and with-ret-info unify. Indeed, with can be
removed (syntactically), and st and ret-info unify, because returned can be a lexical
counterpart of search. From this it follows that vk-of-st is syllogistically connected
with the predicate, via with-ret-info.
We represent the above unification as an indexical premise and merge it with the
most recent memory sign (a rheme). The resulting sign is represented as an index.
<ALL,vk-of-st,is sev-ws>
<ALL,t-ineeds,is dt-of-info>
⇒ <SOME,dt-of-info,is sev-ws>
Here, it is required that vk-of-st and t-ineeds unify. Because the references of vk
and their are different, it follows that we have to unify search-task and info-needs.
Such a unification is possible, because both signs are accumulations, and task and
need are lexical counterparts.
The relation of the syllogistic signs of our text as a phenomenon is depicted
in fig. 6. In this graph, the terms of a premise are connected by a boldface solid
line. Semantic relations are represented by a (normal) solid line. Signs which are
semantically equivalent, or are converses of each other, are connected by a dotted
and dashed line, respectively. Unification is indicated by a pair of arrows.
4.1 Towards a Summarization
A summary of our text is generated as follows. We start from the graph of fig. 6,
find a path between the subject (user) and the predicate (canb-satf-with-ret-info)
of the entire text as a phenomenon, via context signs (i.e. all other signs), and
generate a syntactic representation for this path as a sentence. Clearly, all signs
involved in such a path can contribute to the meaning of a summary (semantically).
Signs which are connected by a boldface or dotted line are equivalent and can be
represented by any one of them. A constituent of a sentence must be represented
user−canb−satf−with−ret−info
vt−of−users users
needstheir retwith
info info
dt−ofdocb
dt−of info
vt−of
Conclusion:
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canb−satf−with−ret−infouser
task
sev−ws
vk−of−st
info
search
Fig. 6: Sample text analyzed
by the sentence sign, but a sentence can alternatively be represented by all of its
constituent signs. A possible summary generated from user, t-ineeds, canb-satf, with,
docb is the following (notice that docb and ret are transitively equivalent, and info
is represented by t-ineeds; their is replaced by a syntactic alternative):
Users’ information needs can be satisfied with document-bases.
Notice that the phrasing of an actual, syntactically correct sentence expressing
a summary is a challenge that is beyond the focus of this paper.
4.2 Analysis Revisited
We may conclude that the above summary correctly describes the meaning of the
basic functionality of an IR system, precisely as the thesis suggests. Notice that
the subject and the predicate of the entire text are necessary for the representation
of the summary as a sentence, but it is the set of context signs which help us to
understand why such a summary is indeed a meaningful characterization of the given
text, and in which sense.
Another possible summary, There are several ways, requires knowledge about
the specific meaning of several ways, the qualities of which are basically due to the
context signs. We can acknowledge this fact by re-phrasing the above summary
as: There are several ways which amount to various kinds of search tasks, where
amount is used as a semantic equivalent of be. But we should not overestimate the
potential of such syllogistic summarization. Optimally, our approach should model
the entire text as a single phenomenon and derive the corresponding qualisigns.
Such an effort, which would allow for sophisticated re-phrasings, might need, besides
syllogism (basically deductive), inductive or abductive reasoning. The above result
indicates that even with a limited apparatus a quite interesting summary can be
produced.
5 Summary and Conclusion
We have presented a framework for meaning extraction based on cognitive and
semiotic principles strictly using lexical information about the words involved. The
ultimate goal of this framework is that we want to boil down a text (consisting
of cohering sentences) to a single phenomenon and represent it by signs. Such an
effort may ultimately need the full scale of logical reasoning. This paper shows that
interesting results can be achieved even by applying deduction alone.
In our view, the basic question concerning summarization of a given text relates
to the correspondence between the entire text and its summary: how can we explain
that there is a meaningful relation between subject and predicate of such a summa-
rizing sentence? Also, how does (previously acquired) lexical knowledge contribute
to the anticipation of possible meanings?
Our answer could be illustrated well by the classical syllogistic conclusion ‘Socrates
is mortal’, taken as an instance of a summary. The concept of ‘Socrates’ and the
concept of ‘mortal’ are related, because the other premises of the syllogistic scheme
(considered here to be the entire text) imply via the common term ‘human’ that
such a relation exists. Notice that the common term is not part of the summarizing
sentence. However, it is part of our knowledge about the generation of the syllogistic
conclusion.
In our semiotic approach, such a common term as a sign amounts to a context.
In the text (premises), the common term is semantically used in two ways: as a
subject and as a predicate, requiring the possibility for conversion. Our framework
shows that such a conversion may emerge from concepts (for example, words) which
are counterparts. Such counterparts are based on qualities which belong to the same
phenomenon, and define it. Counterparts represent those qualities, alternatively as
parts and as a whole (typically by using different denotations for the two). For
example, in this context the noun ‘human’ represents the parts that constitute the
concept and ‘(to be) human’ the properties that characterize those parts as a whole.
‘Human’ as a common term then represents the coherency of these symbols.
The above understanding of the notion of context, which relates subject and
predicate of the sign of a particular phenomenon, can be seen as an attempt to
represent contextualized meaning. It is often emphasized (for example in [WF86])
that contextualized meaning of words is much richer than their lexical meaning, and
therefore is so complex that its representation presents a serious implementation
problem. Practical approaches try to circumvent this by restricting meaning to
(finite) sets of features. Despite such restriction, the complexity of such approaches
is very high, which may be due to their formal nature. Indeed, features and the
combination of such features are typically formally defined. Because such features
refer to qualities of real-world phenomena, a cognitively based approach would more
appropriately reflect the real nature of (lexical) properties, and a semiotic framework
may offer a more simple treatment of their combination.
In our approach, a representation of contextualized meaning emerges dynami-
cally as a “side effect” of sign generation. For example, information (as it appears in
our summary) receives its contextualized meaning via the other signs (forming the
context of the summarizing sentence). In context, information refers to that partic-
ular instance of the general (lexical) notion which is of their, where their refers to
users which are of various types, and that this information is the one that is returned
via various kinds of search tasks. We maintain that such a web of relations can be
represented as a coherent set of logical consequences, as suggested by the title of
this paper.
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